Jump to content

EMS Weather vs. Safety


Recommended Posts

OK, I am sure that most would agree that the recent A021 FAA mandates requiring Highest Obsticle in Route calculations on each leg are a useless waste of time. Without proximity limits, they are nothing more than another paperwork drill, often using "made up numbers" rarely derived from actual map study. :angry:

 

Obviously, we are not running into manmade obsticles at the rate that we are CFIT. The recent OMNI accident points in that direction.

 

In light of all the brain numbing "run in circles, scream and shout" logic of the FAA rulemakers, why not just prohibit Marginal VFR at night? Too simple for the FAA to claim as effective? 3000 and 5 seems to be a reasonable man's approach.

 

Your thoughts?

Edited by SkidKid
Link to comment
Share on other sites

There ain't no cure for stupid. Those are my thoughts. No matter what rules and regulations the feds come up with, stupid people will still find a way to kill themselves and others. I've been doing this for a long time, and I find the current weather minima to be more than adequate, by far the highest I've ever flown to in 40+ years. But I also know that I'm not going to push things too far, and that others will. One size does not fit all, but one size is all that exists. The sad fact is that people will continue to die, no matter what, and the only possible way to keep anyone else from being killed in EMS accidents is to completely eliminate all EMS flying. I don't favor that solution.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The truth of the matter is this: HEMS is the only commercial aviation allowed to fly VFR at night. True VFR is 3000 cielings and 5 miles visability. Less is Marginal, down to the oft quoted 1000 and 3 for fixed wing, and lower for helicopters. We have, as currently ruled, the ability to consider flights into conditions which rapidly deteriorate into solid IMC, and without an autopilot or second pilot.

 

The US is the only country that allows this practice, and the US has the highest accident rate among HEMS communities. I believe there is indeed a correlation here. Unsatisfactory in my book.

 

Part A: Outlaw marginal VFR at night or institute IFR only at night. This will fix a lot of the Stupid that exists out there by taking away the option of accepting a flight that should never be flown.

 

Part B: As a follow on to this is the need for true Operational Control. As currently stands, the only person involved with flight ops that exercises Operational Control is the PIC. Why do Communication Centers (commonly referred to as "dispatch") pass on calls which clearly should not be considered? Because the companies do no exercise operational control. As an adjunct to the Director of Operations, the Comm Center should be the first line of defense in stopping stupid flight requests. Why call base XYZ when they are known to be sitting in solid IMC? Why pass that same request on to base ABC when it has been turned down? All we are doing is looking for the accident to happen.

 

The company you and I work for has been lucky with IIMC events. No one dead from that in the last 20 years. But, that does not erase the fact that we have had some very close calls with IIMC. Just last year there was a near catastrophic event in Arkansas with a flight going IIMC that if common sense had been used, the flight request would have never been passed to that crew. They were out of their normal operating area, without appropriate pubs or relevant emergency IIMC cards, and in unfamiliar rising terrain. Datalink needs to be the overarching functionaries in the Comm Center, putting the halt to such directionless activities.

 

You are right, you cannot fix stupid. You can, on the other hand, not let stupid make the call to go fly.

 

My .02 worth.

Edited by SkidKid
Link to comment
Share on other sites

HEMS is the only commercial aviation allowed to fly VFR at night.

That, quite simply, is not true, for the USA. All commercial aviation in the US can fly VFR at night. I have several hundred hours of night time, most of it VFR.

 

The PIC is always the personal responsible for flight decisions. Some guy sitting in Missouri has no idea what the conditions in Texas are, nor what the terrain is, nor what my experience level is. If the boss wants to get involved, fine, and if he tells me to turn down a flight, that's also fine. But micromanaging every flight at every base is silly, and not practically possible. I have no problem with dispatch calling me, as long as they tell me if someone else has turned down the flight. I've taken flights that other programs have turned down, and have never been even close to minimums on them. I'm careful about accepting them, of course, and turn down more of them than I accept. Sometimes it's an isolated cell over the other base, sometimes it the HEMS tool showing low ceilings falsely. One area on it showed 100 foot ceilings and 1/4 mile vis continuously for months. It lies a lot, both ways. I know my area, and my limits, better than anyone else.

 

IFR for EMS is a red herring. I do probably 75% scene flights, in rural areas. IFR, under the current regulations, is out of the question. There is no approach available to the scene, nor is it possible to depart IFR from a location without weather reporting under Part 135. I don't need to take the patient to an IFR airport, but to a hospital, and quickly. The technology to allow IFR to and from scenes is close to being possible, but it would require a drastic change to the regulations, not possible in the short term. Requiring all IFR means, in essence, eliminating all night EMS. That's possible, but I don't think it's practical, nor morally correct. In truth, we probably don't save that many lives, but we do lower morbidity, by eliminating a couple of hours in the back of an ambulance for stroke, cardiac, and severe trauma victims. A hundred miles by back roads, or even interstate, takes time in a box, and time is something not all patients have. It's different for those who fly around big cities, but they only take up a tiny fraction of the land area of the US. If you want to prohibit faster treatment to those patients, it's possible, of course, but you need to know what you're doing, and you really need to look closely at the cost/benefit ratio.

Edited by Gomer Pylot
Link to comment
Share on other sites

That, quite simply, is not true, for the USA. All commercial aviation in the US can fly VFR at night. I have several hundred hours of night time, most of it VFR.

 

Not quite. I was thinking of scheduled air carriers and did not spell that out very well at all, sorry.

 

The PIC is always the personal responsible for flight decisions. Yes, but some, especially the newly hired pilot, should not be called when the HEMSTool shows pink over his/her area. Just an opportunity to fail, with no opportunity to succeed. This is not that challenging to implement. . . . . .micromanaging every flight at every base is silly, and not practically possible.

 

I know my area, and my limits, better than anyone else. Granted, and you have been doing this for quite a while. The accidents within AEL have been at bases less than 18 months from opening. One exception is Shoals, and the pilot was within 6 months of hire date. The urge to impress is sometimes overwhelming for the new crew member(s).

 

IFR for EMS is a red herring. I do probably 75% scene flights, in rural areas. IFR, under the current regulations, is out of the question. There is no approach available to the scene, nor is it possible to depart IFR from a location without weather reporting under Part 135. I don't need to take the patient to an IFR airport, but to a hospital, and quickly. The technology to allow IFR to and from scenes is close to being possible, but it would require a drastic change to the regulations, not possible in the short term. Requiring all IFR means, in essence, eliminating all night EMS. That's possible, but I don't think it's practical, nor morally correct. In truth, we probably don't save that many lives, but we do lower morbidity, by eliminating a couple of hours in the back of an ambulance for stroke, cardiac, and severe trauma victims. A hundred miles by back roads, or even interstate, takes time in a box, and time is something not all patients have. It's different for those who fly around big cities, but they only take up a tiny fraction of the land area of the US. If you want to prohibit faster treatment to those patients, it's possible, of course, but you need to know what you're doing, and you really need to look closely at the cost/benefit ratio.

Airport to airport, or helipad to helipad, IFR is not that difficult. Also, you must have fewer weather reporting stations there. Are you in OK? If so, I can see your point. In the flat lands, there is no significant difference in AGL cloud base elevations from point A to B. In the Mountainous areas, IFR enroute to VMC to cross an obscurred ridgeline is not only practical, but desired.

 

Overall, your argument is sound, and that is why my original proposal was to simply ban Marginal VFR flights at night. Simple, easily understood and enforced. When the conditions are falling, it gives the pilot more time to diagnose and take corrective action without an IIMC/CFIT event.

 

Best Regards!

 

d

Edited by SkidKid
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Part B: As a follow on to this is the need for true Operational Control. As currently stands, the only person involved with flight ops that exercises Operational Control is the PIC. Why do Communication Centers (commonly referred to as "dispatch") pass on calls which clearly should not be considered? Because the companies do no exercise operational control. As an adjunct to the Director of Operations, the Comm Center should be the first line of defense in stopping stupid flight requests. Why call base XYZ when they are known to be sitting in solid IMC? Why pass that same request on to base ABC when it has been turned down? All we are doing is looking for the accident to happen.

 

I think they should call multiple bases on every call. Even if another base or the competitor turned it down, the flight still might be good to go.

 

For instance, the nearest bases an it's competition sit in a river valley south of the transfer hospital or scene. The bases or the area between are fogged in. The flight gets turned down by both, yet the bases to the north could have gotten in there no problem, with an extended ETA. Or if the scene was fogged in too, they could have ground transported to a known clear area where the northern base could meet them.

 

Next, I can't tell you how many flights I hear get turned down for "weather" around shift change time--especially if it's at the end of a guy's hitch. Last hitch, I did three flights in that were turned down for WX by a neighbor base and competition (all were 10+SM viz and no ceiling.......some small fog patches in the valley). Each was around 6-7 o'clock.

 

Also, I've heard one our competitor's dispatch turn flights down for "weather" if they are doing maintenance or are out of service. I call down to my buddy who works the same hitch and ask WTF, and they say they're down for whatever and never even had the request routed to them. We take the flight, so it's an attempt to make us look reckless in front of the requesting agency.

 

Call additional bases, but do tell them which other bases turned it down.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Delorean:

 

Common Sense must be allowed to rule the day. I stated: "Why do Communication Centers (commonly referred to as "dispatch") pass on calls which clearly should not be considered?" Would you invite your friends, piloted by a lesser experienced pilot, to their death? A common grave is what awaits those who do not use common sense. If the area is IMC, then it is IMC. Companies need to nip stupid flights in the bud, before it makes it to the base.

 

I assume from your enthusiasm for this business that you are either new, or a medical type. Either way, please consider that there is no mission in EMS. It is merely a business. When the phone rings, it is merely a flight request. The US business models, with the accompanying business practices, have not been particularly successful from the safety standpoint. We need to think outside of our limited perspectives to get the better answers.

 

Helicopter shopping, which is what you encourage without naming it as such, should never be encouraged. I cannot help but think of one recent example: the PHI crash in Indiana. 2 or 3 services turned the flight down, and this pilot, with crew right behind him, took off to "take a look at it" and crashed in short order into a nearby garage. Terrible judgment on their part, and on the part of the company that called them when the weather was less than 400 foot overcast/obscured. Of special emphasis here is: Don't helicopter shop, especially IN YOUR OWN COMPANY!

 

I understand that some do not use the turndown system properly. I understand that there are some pilots who turn down flight requests because it is near their end of shift. These are not my problem, and their own companies need to address these situations. As an aside, think about some of these pilots who do not get paid for overshift flights. The companies expect to be paid for their work, and so should the pilots. If you want the flight completed, pay me. I have to understand that it may damage the company, but they also need to pay for services rendered. I do not have to be concerned with this where I work, as my employer pays for over shift work, but I do understand the pilot frustration in those companies that do not.

 

Th US HEMES model has not been successful in the safety arena. No other country in the civilized world has such a poor record. What are they doing right? The Washington Post recently documented the fact that HEMS in America is the most dangerous job outside of commercial crabbing. We have the worst safety record in aviation except Arial Applicators (crop dusters).

 

It is not possible for us to rewind the clock and do things differently. We are too far into the reality of SPIFR/SPVFR to change anytime soon. But, think about the safety advantages that 2 pilots bring to the table. There is a reason that a military flight with an 800 hour PIC and a 300 hour SIC can fly in rough terrain, near max gross wt., on the goggles in marginal weather at TERF altitudes. That reason is: 2 brains are better than one!! Even a minimally qualified SIC can do the mundane radio changes and cross checks which allow the pilot at the controls to concentrate on flying. But this will not happen in the current US business environment.

 

So, where do we go from here? I proposed 2 quick, simple methods to REDUCE the carnage that is known as US HEMS operations. No MVFR night flights and proper oversight within the company communications systems. Not that difficult!

 

The recent accident in SC does not have any findings of fact, yet, but it is apparently a record played far too often. Pilot took off with 1400 Overcast and a 1-2 degree dewpoint spread. Even with this high ceiling, it deteriorated quickly and he crashed, killing himself and 2 others. There is no honor in this. If he had 3000 foot ceilings and 5 miles visibility, he would have had MUCH more time to correct for the deteriorating circumstances around his aircraft.

 

Low Level route segments will come from the FAA in the years ahead, but that is a long way from being a reality. Let's just use some Common Sense in the interum.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I am not "new" and I am not a "medical type". 6 yrs in HEMS, flying for 15 yrs, 3500 hrs, civilian, A&P/IA, CFI/CFII, BS in Aviation Management, & MBA.

 

I do not treat it as a "mission". Honestly, I like getting paid to sleep. I work tons of OT and still only fly 150 hrs a year on average. I do not sit around the whole shift with my flight suit on, glued to a scanner. I sleep most of the day or night and when the tones go off, I get up and check the WX. If it's good, I put the flight suit back on and we go. I won't fly at night if it's below 5-6 SM and/or below 2000 AGL. I depends on the location, but that's generally where I draw the line........even with the NVGs.

 

I never said you should be out flying below the minimums, nor anywhere near them like those those guys in IN a few years ago (or any of the WX accidents last summer.) You're never going to eliminate the "white knight" syndrome no matter how many rules you make up.

 

But you can't leave these decisions up to dispatch or make a blanket rule that if one guy turns the flight down, it's done. Call the next closest base, tell them who turned it down and why, and leave it up to the PIC. If you leave it up to dispatch to TURN DOWN flights, soon enough, they're going to be the ones ACCEPTING the flights for you.

 

With some of what you referenced, I'm pretty sure we work for the same company........and if you were here in Fall 2005 you may remember when our ex-DO mandated that dispatch SHALL NOT inform the base if someone else turned it down. He was observed the 2nd call base turning flights down just because someone else did (no WX check.) 90-95% of the time it was a legit turndown, but he wanted to eliminate that 5-10% when they were just turning it down b/c they didn't want to fly. Needless to say that policy only lasted a few months, since all of us were calling each other anyway.

 

Before "crew rest", there was one base that had their own agreement if they did 2-3 flights, they would turn down everything that night for WX. The high-ups drove over there one of those nights when it was crystal clear out and no WX within 100+ miles. Called in a fake flight request and had it turned down......not a single light in the base ever came on. All three fired and rightly so.

 

It's easy to abuse the power of "PIC" and you can ALWAYS find a way to turn a flight down if you're tired. But keep it up and you'll be out of a job. Like you said, it's a business and the company isn't going to keep pilots and med crews around that won't fly at night no matter how clear it is. In this business, a life does have a price........and if "safety" truely was #1 the HEMS industry would not exist. $emper dollar$

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Excellent post.

 

I do take exception to 2 items:

 

1. "If you leave it up to dispatch to TURN DOWN flights, soon enough, they're going to be the ones ACCEPTING the flights for you." That logic does not follow. I can see why you would be concerned about it, but this is not necessarily to follow.

 

2. You seem to miss the fact that I have repeatedly stated that the calls that should not be passed to the base level are those in BAD WEATHER. You bring up good weather analogies that do not follow the logic of the argument.

 

It is all about common sense. The situations you mention sound as though they have occured West of the Mississippi. There are essentially 2 AELs, divided by the big river. Some of the bases close to the MR on the East have been poluted, but overall, the self policing in the East is better than out west.

 

Sorry for calling you a newb/medical type. I would have been insulted if you had said that to me.

 

RS

 

d

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Skidd, Delorean has been at this for awhile and flys North of the border. It doesn't bother me if dispatch calls even after another program has turned it down. It's my policy to always ask if someone turned it down and why.

 

I don't need "dispatch" making my decision for me. That is what I am paid to do. There are things I would like to see changed in the EMS area. However, the biggest factor in the accidents is the decision making process the pilots make. We are the ones to blame.

 

We can fly twins, with TCAS, TWAS amd every other gadget but the pilot still makes all the decisions. It's the decision the pilot makes to launch in marginal weather or when weather is fine but all the indicators are there for it to turn south.

 

It is going to be difficult to effect change in our industry. 2 pilots may help but 75% of our EMS fleet would not be able to take on the weight and the cost would put a lot of companies out.

 

Again, nearly all accidents could have been prevented with sound decision making. Learning to identify links in the accident chain and how to break it is important. The vast majority of accidents happen at night. That is when weather becomes a bigger factor sue to darkness(already harder to see) and the fact that it's now cooler and more prone to fog or low clouds. Much more scruitney should be placed on calls after sunset. Pilots really need to err on the side of caution.

 

I am sorry but I strongly believe that this problem is not something that can be fixed with more equipment but learning how to make effective decisions and when to say no. Don't be worried about spending the night somewhere. Who cares? I have a company credit card I can use for a hotel, car and what ever I may need should I have to spend the night somewhere.

 

JD

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'll say it one more time. You can't cure stupid, no matter what rules you put in. It just can't be done, so it's a waste of time to try. I also see other programs turn down flights that aren't even close to minimums, often clear & 20, but they just don't want to go, or are down for maintenance or lack of crew. But even if you make the minimums 5000/10, stupid people will still go out and kill themselves. The only way to eliminate all accidents is to quit flying. Period. And if you require all IFR ships, the number will go down to about 10% of what are in use now, and the number of jobs will go down there, too. I'm not sure I want to see that. Sure, it's difficult flying in the mountains, but if you don't like it, move. Nobody makes you take a flight, and I've never seen any repercussions for turning one down. The minimums are there for everybody, but if you don't think it's safe to take a flight at minimums, turn it down. The world won't end, and you won't get fired.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

2. You seem to miss the fact that I have repeatedly stated that the calls that should not be passed to the base level are those in BAD WEATHER. You bring up good weather analogies that do not follow the logic of the argument.

 

I couldn't agree with you more regarding helicopter shopping, however, look at the people you're giving the power to turn down flights. In most cases, you're talking about young folks with no flight or previous dispatching experience in this MINIMUM WAGE, high turnover job.

 

Do you want someone halfway across the country looking at some weather report they probably don't understand and turning a flight down for you? Is the company going to give that reponsibility to them when they're paying an experienced pilot? And I guarantee if these folks get trained for operational control to turn flights down, they will start tracking the requests that they accepted and you turned down. That is going to get ugly fast and start another pilot vs. dispatch war (e.g. WX turndown form, circa 2006.)

 

I'm still with the other guys, we do not need more people in the loop with operational control. They pay me to fly (or not fly) IAW with the GOM--I should be the one making the decision. And if someone else turns it down, I will take that into consideration, but they are not the final authority. This isn't a "power struggle" or ego thing, I just see too many guys in this job that are burned out, don't want to fly, and/or lack critical thinking skills.

 

For instance, the typical flight is A -> B -> C -> A.

 

-I know several guys that if they can't get back to base (C -> A), they turn the flight down.

-If it's a transfer and you can't make it B -> C, why not suggest another receiving hospital (D)?

-On a scene call, if you can't make it A -> B, tell them to meet you somewhere where the weather is good (like the base). Or suggest another base that might be able to do it.

 

I do this all the time and probably get 2-3 flights a month that would otherwise be lost. I'm not doing this to save lives, get our managers their "budget", or because I like to fly........I'm just doing my job. We should be looking for every possible way to capture these flights if it's safe and within the GOM. Like it or not, there is a budget and if your base isn't paying its own bills, it goes away. Leave the marketing to the managers to drum up the requests, but it my responsibilty to make every ATTEMPT to fly those requests if safe & legal.

 

One final thought........On that recent commuter crash in NY, the NTSB or FAA commented about the low pay for the pilots and how there was a lack of experience because of it. Make HEMS the highest paying helicopter job and there will not be a hiring shortage. If they have to fire a guy, there will be someone waiting in line for the job and someone there to cover the OT until they arrive.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

First, last and always: The PIC accepts dispatch or refuses the request, period. That is THE JOB, in a nutshell. I'll make the decision for myself. Share the data if it's been shopped and refused by another service, but I'm going to decide for myself.

 

In this industry, anytime you're "taking a look" you're admitting that the weather sucks and you're still accepting dispatch anyhow. Using that idiot to support the position that 'helicopter shopping' is as bad. Yes, I knew the individual mentioned, and I was surprised.

Edited by Wally
Link to comment
Share on other sites

OK, The proposal for not calling the bases seems to get the most resistance, but the DataLink PILOTS, in the proposed scenario, would be making that determination. Small point, but significant. Part 121 operations do it all the time. Their record stands for itself. ;)

 

Ban MVFR flights at night for VFR still makes more sense than HFE determinations, which make no sense unless tied to a lateral displacement form the line of flight.

 

Best counter of the tread is: "One final thought........On that recent commuter crash in NY, the NTSB or FAA commented about the low pay for the pilots and how there was a lack of experience because of it. Make HEMS the highest paying helicopter job and there will not be a hiring shortage. If they have to fire a guy, there will be someone waiting in line for the job and someone there to cover the OT until they arrive." AMEN to THAT!!!

 

Good discussion, guys! :D

Link to comment
Share on other sites

There is no way Datalink or any other control center can keep up with every flight request that comes in. They can't even keep up with the weather across the country. They're there to help if you need it making a decision, but they simply cannot make a decision on every flight request. They're not available half the time, anyway, when they are called. That just won't work.

 

I agree about the HFE BS. The reason for that being given to us is that the FAA had to do something, and seen to do something. Like most of the FAA's actions, it's just eyewash and does nothing constructive. We just have to live with it.

 

What the company pays me for is my judgement. Everything else is just added value, or not. If I use bad judgement, I pay the consequences, but my judgement is what I get paid for. I decide whether or not to take a flight. Not the chief pilot, not the med crew, not Datalink - just me. If inexperienced pilots take flights they shouldn't, that's the fault of management, for hiring inexperienced pilots in the first place, and they should pay for it, but we know that ain't gonna happen. Most programs are hiring the best-qualified pilots they can, but you get what you pay for, or less. But if you pay the minimum, you get the minimum. That's the bottom line. If you want to really reduce the number of accidents, increase the minimum qualifications to several thousand hours, and raise the pay by about 25 - 50%, and you'll get pilots who know what they're doing, and will make intelligent weather decisions. I know very well that at 1,000 hours I still didn't know diddly squat about flying or making judgement calls. The knowledge and judgement came the hard way over a few decades of flying. I don't believe it's very different for anyone else.

Edited by Gomer Pylot
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Too true. That's why the only truly safe path is to quit flying entirely. Since that's not practical, we have to accept the fact that accidents will happen, and try to eliminate them in the most practical and least costly manner. Least costly being in both human and fiscal terms.

 

However, I do think that pro rata, higher-time pilots have fewer accidents than low-time pilots. IIRC, the highest accident rate is among those with 1000-5000 hours, and decreases quickly above that. Having tens of thousands of hours is not a guarantee of safety, but it's certainly an indicator.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

They're not available half the time, anyway, when they are called. That just won't work. The worst argument is "it just won't work." It can work, but not in the present state of affairs. Hire more, increase capability.

 

I agree about the HFE BS. The reason for that being given to us is that the FAA had to do something, and seen to do something. Like most of the FAA's actions, it's just eyewash and does nothing constructive. We just have to live with it.

 

What the company pays me for is my judgement. Everything else is just added value, or not. If I use bad judgement, I pay the consequences, but my judgement is what I get paid for. I decide whether or not to take a flight. The pilots who plowed them in were paid for their judgment as well. The problem is, there are too many people whe suffer the consequences in the poor judgment scenario, the pilot is the least of these.

 

Not the chief pilot, not the med crew, not Datalink - just me. Actually, the OpsMan gives the DO the first line of authority when it comes to initiating a flight, its conduct, or terminating a flight. That is the definition of Operational Control. They can determine the conduct of the flight through company standards. This is not all about the Pilot. The Operator has many responsibilities, and the pilots have demonstrated poor capabilities as reflected by the current accident rate.

 

If inexperienced pilots take flights they shouldn't, that's the fault of management, for hiring inexperienced pilots in the first place, and they should pay for it, but we know that ain't gonna happen. You cannot have it both ways. "It is my decision, just me." and then to expect the management to bear the responsibility is duplicious

 

Most programs are hiring the best-qualified pilots they can, but you get what you pay for, or less. But if you pay the minimum, you get the minimum. That's the bottom line. If you want to really reduce the number of accidents, increase the minimum qualifications to several thousand hours, and raise the pay by about 25 - 50%, and you'll get pilots who know what they're doing, and will make intelligent weather decisions. Agreed! And I have argued that point for years. Even when I was in management.I know very well that at 1,000 hours I still didn't know diddly squat about flying or making judgement calls. The knowledge and judgement came the hard way over a few decades of flying. I don't believe it's very different for anyone else.

Edited by SkidKid
Link to comment
Share on other sites

It is not possible for the DO to look at every flight. The DO has the responsibility, but he has to delegate that responsibility, and the end of the delegation chain is the PIC. The DO in reality is responsible for promulgating rules and attitudes, and for hiring and training competent pilots. If he hires inexperienced pilots, he is culpable, If the board of directors allows those hiring practices, either through setting salaries so low that it's not possible to hire competent pilots, or through ignoring events, then they are culpable. The PIC has the final decision, and he is culpable for what happens after he accepts the flight. Whether there is any shared culpability from higher management depends on a number of factors, especially on whether the PIC had the necessary training and experience. It is unrealistic, IMO, to expect active operational control on every flight. Management sets a company culture, whether that culture advocates aggressively accepting all possible flights or turning down any marginal flight. The culture ultimately determines whether a pilot takes a questionable flight. Personally, I've seen no pressure at all to take flights, if anything the opposite. If one's personal minimums are higher than those published, I've seen no repercussions.

 

I see your point about flights in the mountains where it's dark, but I don't see raising minimums as the answer. In order to fly VFR at night, one has to have sufficient surface lighting, and if you don't have it, you can't fly VFR at all, no matter how high the ceilings are or how good the visibility. You should know where you are going to have lights and where you won't, and the initial base orientation should include this. Where I am, there is plenty of lighting everywhere, and the terrain is relatively flat, so that is almost never a problem, but it can be in other areas, and the PIC must take that into consideration.

 

[Pedant alert] there is no such word as 'duplicious'. [/Pedant alert] B)

Edited by Gomer Pylot
Link to comment
Share on other sites

It is not possible for the DO to look at every flight. The DO has the responsibility, but he has to delegate that responsibility, and the end of the delegation chain is the PIC. Exactly! All I am saying with the incrase in Datalink capabilities, responsibilities and oversight, is that the DO/Operator should be more involved, as PICs have not performed the function very well. You, and I, have performed the function very well. You are still around! There are others who will not be so capable. The company is big and needs to protect its assets from the 1%.

 

I agree totally with the rest of the 1st part \.

 

I see your point about flights in the mountains where it's dark, but I don't see raising minimums as the answer. In order to fly VFR at night, one has to have sufficient surface lighting, and if you don't have it, you can't fly VFR at all, no matter how high the ceilings are or how good the visibility. You should know where you are going to have lights and where you won't, and the initial base orientation should include this. Where I am, there is plenty of lighting everywhere, and the terrain is relatively flat, so that is almost never a problem, but it can be in other areas, and the PIC must take that into consideration.

 

[Pedant alert] there is no such word as 'duplicious'. [/Pedant alert] B)

 

Sorry, I left out the "t". Should have been duplicitous

:P

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Well, here's the issues I see with the current rage for consultation, oversight, etc.- it dilutes responsibility. If somebody's reviewed the situation prior to the dispatch request, the presumption is that it meets the criteria for acceptance. Those who know better will check it out for themselves, but eventually parties will be 'known' for their decision making, and even the old scaredy cats will get used to that result. I do trust PIREPs from some more than others, that's the bad side of experience.

An alternative is criteria that requires a consultation in marginal situations. That too, dilutes responsibility. If the WX is not good enough to launch on your own, it's not going to be any better after a chat. Worse with enough talk, you can convince yourself that up is down, black is white. If there's any doubt, any doubt at all, there is no doubt- decline.

And that's the best answer of all- empower easy aborts and declines. Give the guy in the hot seat all the data, power and convenience needed to make the call. Stuck in Scuffle Grit? Security is on the way with a rental car, we'll recover the aircraft when we can...

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I agree with Wally. Tell me the rules, tell me where the flight needs to go, and I'll tell you if I can do it. I don't need help making that decision. If I'm young and inexperienced, I have to get experience somehow, and making decisions is one way. What management needs to do, indeed must do if this is to work, is to stay the hell out of the process, and back the pilots when their decision is to decline the flight. I've have many managers question me for turning down flights, and I was never happy about it, but I never changed my mind, because I wanted to keep on living and flying. There is nothing worse than management pushing pilots to take flights, because there is already plenty of pressure, both self-imposed and imposed by peers and med crews. I haven't seen any of that in this job, and the pressure on pilots is almost entirely self-imposed.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I really like my company. No one ever questions a turn down. The powers to be don't call me to ask why, they don't even bring it up in discussion. On top of that, we(pilots) are backed 100%.

 

I have heard some stories from other companies getting on thier pilots to take a flight. That is just wrong and is bad culture.

 

JD

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.
Note: Your post will require moderator approval before it will be visible.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

Loading...
×
×
  • Create New...