Sikorsky crash near LAX

[deerock]

not much information yet:

 

http://www.ktla.com/news/landing/ktla-helicopter-crash-el-segundo,0,3767114.story

[Goldy]

not much information yet:

 

http://www.ktla.com/news/landing/ktla-helicopter-crash-el-segundo,0,3767114.story

 

Ahh, I missed this post and re-posted same. Obviously an S-58 doing a lift....I'll try and get a tail number. Definitely not the orange Summit ship that is local. Glad to hear the pilot survived the crash. Sounds like the building wont make it....

[SpiralWing]

This might have been part of the problem:

 

"Fergus said before the aircrafy crashed, some people pulled the pilot from inside."

[arotrhd]

Looks like one of the ships from ARIS/ Heli-Flite Inc @ KRAL. Hopefully PIC (might have been Steve or Sam) don't have anything life threatening & return to the controls soon.

 

Made breaking news line on Drudge Report...

 

-WATCH FOR THE PATTERNS, WATCH FOR THE WIRES-

[Goldy]

Looks like one of the ships from ARIS/ Heli-Flite Inc @ KRAL. Hopefully PIC (might have been Steve or Sam) don't have anything life threatening & return to the controls soon.

 

Made breaking news line on Drudge Report...

 

-WATCH FOR THE PATTERNS, WATCH FOR THE WIRES-

 

Yes, it looks like it was from Heli-Flite.

[iChris]

not much information yet:

 

http://www.ktla.com/...0,3767114.story

 

Link: video report and witness account

 

NTSB Identification: WPR11FA163

Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 133: Rotorcraft Ext. Load

Accident occurred Sunday, March 13, 2011 in El Segundo, CA

Aircraft: SIKORSKY S-58ET, registration: N33602

Injuries: 1 Serious.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

 

On March 13, 2011, about 0930 Pacific daylight time, a Sikorsky S-58ET, N33602, descended and veered off the side of an office building in El Segundo, California, while lifting an external load from the roof. The commercial pilot was seriously injured. The helicopter was substantially damaged, and consumed by a post impact fire. The helicopter was registered to Heli Flight, Inc., and operated by Aris Helicopters under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 133, to conduct rotorcraft external load operations. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and a visual flight plan had not been filed. The flight originated from Riverside, California, at 0815.

 

While making the final external load lift from the roof of an office building, the pilot reported that an engine went off line. Witnesses assisting in the operation also reported hearing an engine wind down. The helicopter drifted forward, veered off the side of the roof, and impacted trees and landscaping below. The pilot was extracted from the cockpit by the ground crew, and a post impact fire ensued.

 

Just prior to the accident the pilot reported that he had 400 pounds of fuel. The air scrubber being lifted was expected to weigh between 4,000 and 4,500 pounds. The operator stated that the maximum lifting capability of the helicopter was 5,000 pounds.

Edited March 19, 2011 by iChris

[Goldy]

The pilot went home a couple nights ago with a broken elbow and some cuts and bruises. He was flying in the right seat, and the ship landed on the left side. The unsung heroes in all of this was his ground crew, who reportedly fought back flames and pulled him out. The helicopter burned into nothing, only the tail boom remained. (Remember the S58 is a magnesium based frame.)

 

This was a great outcome considering the alternatives..

[arotrhd]

Great news & thanks for the update Mr. Goldy...I bet the the gent is as strong as a Bull. Hell, a Bull Elephant for that matter. Be seeing you at the PHPA event.

 

Stay safe out there y'all.

 

-WATCH FOR THE PATTERNS, WATCH FOR THE WIRES-

[iChris]

not much information yet:

 

http://www.ktla.com/...0,3767114.story

 

Accident occurred Sunday, March 13, 2011 in El Segundo, CA

Aircraft: SIKORSKY S-58ET

Probable Cause:

 

While making the final external load lift from the roof of an office building, the pilot reported that one of the two engines lost power. Witnesses assisting in the operation also reported hearing an engine wind down. The helicopter drifted forward, veered off the side of the roof, and impacted trees and landscaping below.

 

The pilot reported that he had about 400 lbs of fuel on board before the accident flight. The weight of the air scrubber that was being lifted was estimated to be 4,700 lbs; the maximum lifting capability of the helicopter was 5,000 lbs.

 

The pilot reported that he depressed the electrical cargo release switch a couple of times before the helicopter collided with the building and terrain, but he did not attempt to use the manual release because it would have required him to remove his feet from the antitorque pedals to activate a foot lever next to the pedals.

 

During the wreckage examination, the cargo hook was found in the closed position. Postaccident examination of the hook did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation; however, due to the extensive impact and fire damage to the electrical system, it could not be determined why the hook did not release the load.

 

Organic debris located on the intake screen of the #1 engine and the lack of such debris on the intake screen of the #2 engine indicated that the #2 engine probably was not operating at the time of the accident. A postaccident examination of both engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal engine operation.

 

Had the pilot been able to release the load, he might have been able to make a successful landing.

 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

 

A partial loss of engine power and the failure of the external hook to release the load for undetermined reasons.

 

NTSB Identification: WPR11FA163

Edited November 6, 2012 by iChris

[nightsta1ker]

Glad the pilot got out OK. 3 cheers for the ground crew!

[500F]

No surprises there. If the pilot has to take his hands/feet off the controls to access an emergency release it might as well not be there....

[Goldy]

No surprises there. If the pilot has to take his hands/feet off the controls to access an emergency release it might as well not be there....

 

If Steve couldnt reach it, none of us could.....

[iChris]

 

Accident occurred Sunday, March 13, 2011 in El Segundo, CA

Aircraft: SIKORSKY S-58ET

 

The pilot reported that he depressed the electrical cargo release switch a couple of times before the helicopter collided with the building and terrain, but he did not attempt to use the manual release because it would have required him to remove his feet from the antitorque pedals to activate a foot lever next to the pedals.

 

During the wreckage examination, the cargo hook was found in the closed position. Postaccident examination of the hook did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation; however, due to the extensive impact and fire damage to the electrical system, it could not be determined why the hook did not release the load.

 

NTSB Identification: WPR11FA163

 

 

Interesting, two SK-58T accidents from the same company were in both cases, they had the same problem jettisoning the external load.

 

Accident occurred Saturday, July 12, 2003 in Rancho P.Verdes, CA

Aircraft: Sikorsky S-58ET

 

The external long line was still connected to the cargo hook. Examination of the cockpit disclosed that the electrical cargo release switch was not armed. Post accident tests established that both the electrical release and manual backup cargo release mechanisms functioned.

 

http://www.ntsb.gov/...718X01146&key=1

Edited November 10, 2012 by iChris

[nightsta1ker]

Ruh Roh...

[Nearly Retired]

Hmm, in the accident caused by the T/R failure, the NTSB notes...

When the input shaft to the IGB was rotated by hand, the output shaft did not rotate. The IGB's case housing was observed cracked. The IGB's chip plug was found outside the gearbox receptacle. The chip plug was found inside the tail boom and was hanging by a connecting wire next to the IGB.

 

Okay, so did the pilot not secure the chip plug properly after checking it? After the initial chip light check, he fired up and did five more lifts of air conditioners. Would the disconnected chip plug have prevented him from getting another chip light - - maybe in enough time to set it down and check the plug again instead of having the IGB fail?

[iChris]

Hmm, in the accident caused by the T/R failure, the NTSB notes...

 

 

Okay, so did the pilot not secure the chip plug properly after checking it? After the initial chip light check, he fired up and did five more lifts of air conditioners. Would the disconnected chip plug have prevented him from getting another chip light - - maybe in enough time to set it down and check the plug again instead of having the IGB fail?

 

 

If it was a twist-lock type plug and didn’t locked back in correctly and fell out, any subsequent chip would not yield an indication.

 

When a twist-lock type plug is removed, for ground checks, the seal prevents any fluid leakage. However, what if the gearbox is operating at full RPM, will that seal still hold the fluid without leakage??? Moreover, if the seal didn’t hold, you may end up with a dry gearbox. How long would that gearbox last at full RPM???

 

 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

 

A total loss of antitorque control, due to the fatigue-induced failure of a gear within the drive shaft's intermediate gear box (IGB).

 

Contributing factors were the pilot's improper on-ground decision to continue flight operations following discovery of material on the IGB's chip plug, and his failure to immediately jettison the external load.

Edited November 11, 2012 by iChris

[Nearly Retired]

I agree, Chris, that the NTSB report may not be telling the full story. It's like they didn't even address the fact that the chip plug was found dangling by its wire. And I also agree: There's not much juice in the IGB to begin with -- did all or most of it leak out during the subsequent operation causing it to run dry and to fail?

 

There's no doubt that the first chip light was real - one witness reported seeing definite flakes. Maybe the gearbox was coming apart at that time and would have failed anyway. But the "rest of the story" (as Paul Harvey might say) is as interesting as it is puzzling. In other words, did the pilot add to his problem?

 

Maybe...if the chip plug had stayed in and alerted him (which it --probably-- would have done within minutes, given the three big flakes on the first inspection) he might not have had to practice his tail rotor failure EPs?

 

Either way, not arming the electrical release was a bonehead decision.

[iChris]

But the "rest of the story" (as Paul Harvey might say) is as interesting as it is puzzling. In other words, did the pilot add to his problem?

 

Maybe...if the chip plug had stayed in and alerted him (which it --probably-- would have done within minutes, given the three big flakes on the first inspection) he might not have had to practice his tail rotor failure EPs?

 

Either way, not arming the electrical release was a bonehead decision.

 

 

In both accidents, there were items that were missed that are normally completed by other utility companies.

 

It’s standard procedure for the ground crew to check the cargo hook release just prior to the lift, at the time the longline is attached to the hook. This would have revealed that the cargo hook release switch was in the safe position in the first accident. In the second, it may have revealed a problem with the hook release just prior the lift.

 

Also, in the second accident the pilot couldn’t access the backup release. Moreover, per the pilot's statement, it appears there was prior knowledge the backup was not readily accessible:

 

“The pilot stated that he did not attempt to depress the manual cargo hook release because the manual release is activated by a foot lever next to the antitorque pedals in the cockpit; he did not want to take his feet off the antitorque pedals.”

 

They’re operating an aircraft with known problems that should have been corrected.

 

FAR 29.865 [2]

(2) A control for the backup quick release subsystem, readily accessible to either the pilot or another crewmember, must be provided.

 

It would be Interesting to see what the maintenance manual says about the maintenance procedure the pilot used on the chip light problem in that first accident. In many larger helicopters, any gearbox chip light would require the plug to be pulled and checked. If it was metal fuzz, the procedure calls for a penalty run-up of 20-45 minutes, at operating RPM. Then the aircraft would be shutdown and the chip plug rechecked. If it looked good, the aircraft would then return to service.

Edited November 12, 2012 by iChris

[500F]

^{I agree iChris, but, the aircraft was certified with the release in that location was it not?}

^{27.865 is a certification requirement, not an operating requirement. It is not intended to be retroactive. It is only applied during initial certification and subsequent modificaitons.}

^{27.865 has changed a lot over the years, who’s to say what it looked like 50 years ago.}

 

^{Moreover, readily accessible is quite vague.}

 

^{As I keep saying in reference to the primary release}

^{FAR 37.865 1}

^{(1) A control for the primary quick release subsystem must be installed either on one of the pilot's primary controls or in an equivalently accessible location and must be designed and located so that it may be operated by either the pilot or a crewmember without hazardously limiting the ability to control the rotorcraft during an emergency situation.}

 

^{What is "equivalently accessible location" to me, asking a pilot to take his hands off the primary flight controls during an auto is like asking a driver to roll the windows down and unlock the doors if he sees a crash is imminent, it isn’t going to happen}

[iChris]

^{A control for the primary quick release subsystem must be installed either on one of the pilot's primary controls or in an equivalently accessible location and must be designed and located so that it may be operated by either the pilot or a crewmember without hazardously limiting the ability to control the rotorcraft during an emergency situation.}

 

^{What is "equivalently accessible location" to me, asking a pilot to take his hands off the primary flight controls during an auto is like asking a driver to roll the windows down and unlock the doors if he sees a crash is imminent, it isn’t going to happen}

 

That is the main point, knowingly placing yourself in a position were you would be unable to act fully in an emergency. It appears there was prior knowledge the backup was not accessible and inadequate as an emergency backup (regardless of any minimum certification standards). I would wager that currently, if you were to look at this operator’s aircraft of this type, the problem still exist. Some companies don’t get it. When you see a problem correct it. That secondary release must be accessible.

 

Had it been a high-rise building the results would have been fatally catastrophic. Which could have been the case this time.

 

In this situation, your main objective is to get free of the load, even if you must take a hand or foot off the controls. Take note, if you don’t get free of the load there is no possibility for any autorotation in this situation, tied to a 4,000-pound load stuck on the roof. You’ll end up like in this case, along for the ride, in a rollover off the end of the building. Get that secondary on the cyclic, collective, or elsewhere so you can get to it.

 

Somewhat like a parachutist jumping from an aircraft wearing an emergency chute that he or she knows is unusable.

 

‘Had the pilot been able to release the load, he might have been able to make a successful landing.”

NTSB REPORT

Edited November 13, 2012 by iChris

[500F]

Bingo.

What I'm saying is that I'm not sure it consititues a violation since the FAA has determined that it WAS sufficiently accessable, even though the operator knows otherwise.

Violation or not, it should be fixed in the interest of safety.

[iChris]

Bingo.

What I'm saying is that I'm not sure it consititues a violation since the FAA has determined that it WAS sufficiently accessable, even though the operator knows otherwise.

Violation or not, it should be fixed in the interest of safety.

 

 

 

That’s right, there is no enforceable violation in their actions. It’s enough their suffering. Hopefully, they’ll learn from the event.

 

As you noted, the rule is not retroactive with respect to 27.865 or 29.865. The S58-xT model was typed in 1972. At that time, the rule didn’t even call for the backup to be accessible, common sense ruled. By the year 1998, common sense, had fell to the wayside and the proposal was made to add “readily available.”

 

July 13, 1998, Proposed Amendments to

§§ 27.865(b(2) and 29.865(b(2) Proposed §§ 27.865(b(2) and 29.865(b(2) would change the current requirement that the backup control for the quick-release device be only a manual mechanical control. These proposals would require that a backup quick release subsystem of an approved design be readily available to the pilot or other crewmember.

http://www.gpo.gov/f...df/98-18552.pdf

Edited November 15, 2012 by iChris