Carson

[avbug]

It's been discussed before here, regarding Carson helicopters and falsified weight and balance/performance data, and the mishap that resulted in the death of 9 USFS and company employees. Carson falsified the empty weight of the aircraft and even after the mishap attempted to cover up the false weights on other fleet aircraft by various means of deception.

 

I've seen more than a few operators over the years who attempted to cut corners or outright falsify data, from pencil whipping inspections and maintenance to changing flight and duty records, etc. I've also met a number of pilots who falsified their own records, such as padding their logbooks. Some got caught, some didn't.

 

Sometimes the sentiment is that those crimes are simply administrative, that the worst the FAA could do is impose an administrative penalty and suspend or revoke flying privileges. That's not so. The worst than could happen is death or injury, but the FAA also has the option of pursuing civil penalties, and criminal charges. It was all of those things which applied to Carson, and the Vice President of Carson Helicopters was sentenced to 12 years in prison, in March of this year.

 

The article from Wildfire Today is linked, and copied below:

 

Former VP of Carson Helicopters sentenced to 12 years in prison

 

Today Steve Metheny, the former Vice President of Carson Helicopters, was sentenced to 12 years and 7 months in prison for falsifying documents that led to the crash of a helicopter in 2008 that killed 9 people.

In sentencing Mr. Methey, Ann Aiken, a federal judge for the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, said he violated every oath he ever took when he filed documents to win a $51 million U.S. Forest Service contract.

Metheny has until August 17 to report to federal prison. After his 12 years and 7 months prison sentence, he will be under supervised probation for an additional three years

He was accused of falsifying performance charts and the weights of helicopters his company had under contract to the U.S. Forest Service for supporting wildland fire operations. As of a result of his fraud, a Carson helicopter crashed while trying to lift off with too much weight from a remote helispot on the Iron 44 Fire (or Iron Complex) on the Shasta-Trinity National Forest near Weaverville, California in 2008. Nine people were killed, including the pilot-in-command, a U.S. Forest Service check pilot, and seven firefighters. The copilot and three firefighters were seriously injured.

Mr. Metheny went to great lengths after the crash to attempt to conceal the fraud. When he knew that investigators would be examining the company’s operations, he directed other employees to remove weight from other similar helicopters, including taking off a fuel cell and replacing a very heavy battery with an empty shell of a battery. Some of the employees refused to participate in that deception, with one explaining that he was done lying about the helicopter’s weight.

The Forest Service awarded contracts to Carson, including option years, amounting to over $51,000,000. Carson received $18,831,891.12 prior to the FS canceling the contracts.

The sentencing hearing for Levi Phillips, 45, the former maintenance chief of Carson Helicopters, occurred later the same day. He agreed to cooperate with authorities in the case against Mr. Metheny and pleaded guilty to a single charge of fraud. He was sentenced to 25 months in prison to be followed by 3 years of supervised probation.

The sentencing report on Mr. Metheny prepared by the U.S. Attorney’s office recommended 188 months (15 years and 8 months) of prison time. Below are excerpts from the report, which was dated March 20, 2015:

****

I. FOREST SERVICE WEIGHING OF HELICOPTERS

As a result of the crash of N612AZ, the FS conducted a contract compliance inspection on Carson’s helicopters, eventually bringing about the weighing of each helicopter. Prior to the FS weighing, some of the aircraft were weighed by Carson in Grants Pass. They were found to weigh more than indicated by their W&B documents with one pilot characterizing the overage as considerable..

1. Concealing the Fraud

Metheny and Phillips devised various schemes in an attempt to prevent the FS from discovering the aircraft’s true weights. Metheny talked to Phillips about removing equipment from the helicopter (e.g., auxiliary battery, bifilar weights, and heater) to reduce the aircraft’s weight without recording its removal on the helicopter’s Chart C as well as removing the inner components from the battery and putting the battery’s empty shell back in the aircraft.

 

Metheny directed Phillips to inform the FS inspector coming to weigh N7011M that Carson’s scales had a problem and could not be used, even though there was no problem with the scale at that time. This caused the inspector to leave without being able to weigh the helicopter. Metheny also instructed Phillips to ask one of the helicopter’s crew chiefs to remove the helicopter’s bifilar weights; however, the crew chief refused, explaining that he was done lying about the helicopter’s weight. Later, they discussed the possibility of manipulating the aircrafts fuel gauges making it appear the aircraft was loaded with more fuel than it really was, thereby making the aircraft appear lighter when weighed.

Metheny had another Carson employee instruct one of N103WF’s pilots to remove the bifilar weights before the FS weighing; however, the pilot refused.

Phillips also had discussions with Carson mechanics about removing bifilar weights, a battery, and a fuel cell from N61NH before the helicopter’s FS weighing.

2. Helicopter Weighing

The FS weighed N61NH and N7011M. The weighing revealed that N61NH was 432 lbs. over the bid weight and N7011M was 451 lbs. over the bid weight. Both aircraft were subsequently flown to Carson’s facility in Grants Pass where they were again weighed using the company’s own set of scales and confirmed the accuracy of the FS weighing. The FS weighing of the other helicopters revealed that they all ranged from 113 to 710 lbs. heavier than the bid weights submitted in Metheny’s contract proposals.

The bid weight for N612AZ including the equipment to carry passengers was 12,342 lbs. The NTSB investigation concluded the equipped weight of N612AZ on August 5, 2008 was actually 13,845 lbs. while the falsified weight that the N612AZ pilots used in calculating their allowable payload was 12,408 lbs. The difference between the weight of N612AZ as determined by NTSB and the bid weight was 1,503 lbs., and 1,437 lbs. over the aircraft weight used by the pilots in calculating their allowable payload.

[…]

J. TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACTS

The FS terminated the LFS and IA Contracts with Carson in their entirety. It concluded that all of its helicopters under contract violated FAA regulations by using a falsified performance chart in its operations.

The falsified performance chart was made available to flight crews for calculation of performance capability while conducting flight operations. Use of the chart would directly impact the final calculation of allowable weight the helicopter would be capable of safely carrying. Moreover, Carson failed to submit accurate weight data during the performance of the contract. Incorrect data compromises the allowable payloads, which in turn affects flight safety for contract and agency personnel both in the air and on the ground. The allowable payload determines how much a weight the aircraft can carry for the current environmental conditions, and if it is incorrect, safety is compromised.

From page 31:

When N61NH pilots had problems meeting the necessary payload for carrying passengers, the FS believed a smaller Bell helicopter could carry as many passengers as N61NH while costing them half as much. But when the pilots received the falsified power available performance chart for load calculations, it provided more power indicating they could carry a higher payload. (Attachment #3 p16; Attachment #5 p6-7). Likewise, pilots assigned to other aircraft experienced the same problem in meeting the required payload when a different and less costly type of helicopter was able to carry the same payload. But when they received the falsified performance charts it significantly increased their available payload. (Attachment #5 p6). Moreover, pilots of N103WF and N410GH reported that they were never able to carry the payload indicated by their load calculations—such as, load calculations indicating a capability of carrying 600 gallons of water while only being able to carry 400 gallons. Other pilots even underreported the amount of fuel and cargo in load calculations thereby making the payload appear higher, as well as over-reporting the number of gallons of water dropped on a fire, thereby avoiding questions from the FS. (Attachment #5 p7-8). Based on this information, it is obvious that Carson was paid more than the fair market value for the services they actually rendered.

From page 39:

SENTENCING RECOMMENDATION

In this case, a 188-month term of imprisonment for defendant Steven Metheny is appropriate and reasonable considering the applicable guideline range and based on the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)–that is, the sentence contemplate the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law, provides just punishment for the offense, affords adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and protects the public from further crimes of the defendant.

[…]

Meanwhile, if Metheny’s $170,000 yearly salary and bonuses were not enough, he was stealing continuously from Carson. He used Carson funds to buy jewelry and other personal items for himself and his wife and to renovate their residence and sold Carson helicopter parts and equipment and diverted the proceeds for his own use. Moreover, he stole tail rotor blades from a shipment at Carson’s facility then attempted again to place suspicion on the same person he had animosity toward revealing his self-centered and vindictive nature.

Not only is the recommended 188-month sentence for the offense within the applicable guideline range, though high it may be, it is certainly not extreme and is well warranted in light of the facts of this case. This sentence is particularly justified when considering the magnitude of the fraudulent conduct and intended loss, the effort and manner used to conceal it, the indifference to the safety of those performing helicopter firefighting operations, impeding the NTSB investigation into the cause of the helicopter crash and the large number of people he actually put in danger. Accordingly, this sentence reflects the gravity and seriousness of theoffense, promotes respect for the law, and provides just punishment. It will not only deter the defendant from engaging in future criminal conduct, but will likely deter similarly situated individuals from engaging in this type of illegal activity.

Further, pursuant to the plea agreement in this case, the government will move for the dismissal of the remaining counts as applied to and against Metheny, Counts 2 through 7 and Counts 9 through 23.

Edited June 17, 2015 by avbug

[Matt321]

Sounds like a lot more folks were involved in this deception. It's hard to stop once you head down that slippery slope. Ive heard many of the lines before - "it's only xxxlbs, they flew these things a lot faster than vne before without a problem, we've done it that way before, the aircraft can handle it" - and so many more. I've said one of those lines before after a small over torque. Nobody else saw it, everything feels fine, it's no big deal right? Fortunately, I decided that my ego and reputation just weren't worth putting someone at a greater risk, even if that risk was small. I aborted the flight and wrote up the over torque when I landed. The mechanics were pissed they had to pull off the rotor head for inspection, and the other pilots had their fun with me for the over torque, but it had to be done. My point is, that it was much harder than it should have been for me to make the right decision, and if I had made the wrong one, it would have much easier to make the wrong one again. I doubt any of the pilots or mechanics thought anyone would ever die because they swagged a number here and there. And then the numbers got bigger, and the swagging turned into an enormous lie that no one could stop.

[whoknows idont]

http://wildfiretoday.com/2012/03/27/jury-awards-70-million-for-helicopter-crash-on-iron-complex-fire/

 

I don't know what came out of this in the end. But initially the jury decided that GE has 57% fault in the incident, Sikorsky 20% and Carson only 23%... ?!? This clearly contradicts the entire NTSB report. Even if Carson's claim of a loss of power would be true, it's proven that the engines were regularly operated outside their approved specifications.

The judicial system in the States moves in mysterious ways...

[avbug]

That's the crux of the matter, and there are more than a few operators who permit or encourage it. Occasionally, only following a disaster of varying proportions, something gets done. Regulations change, prosecutions take place.

 

It's said that the regulations are written in blood, and many complain about them, but most of them exist not arbitrarily, but as the result of blood shed somewhere. The recent congressionally-mandated changes to the ATP certificate requirements, for example, were mandated by the crash of Colgan in Buffalo. Agree or disagree, the regulations are written in blood. These include maintenance and performance requirements, too.

 

Sabretech cut corners when putting oxygen generator canisters on board a valuejet DC9, marked the equipment as company hazmat, or comat, which exempted the equipment from many of the usual hazardous materials requirements. The canisters weren't shipped or protected properly and weren't expended, as Sabretech said. The canisters ignited in flight, and Valuejet 592 crashed in the Everglades swamp nearly vertically, on fire. Everyone died. Prosecution took place against Sabretech employees. The mess of fines and legal prosecutions and charges after included charges of murder.

 

Alaskan Airlines 261 crashed off the coast of California following a flight control failure that was the result of improper maintenance, falsified records, and the use of incorrect grease on a critical vertical stabilizer jack screw, and too little of that. Everyone died.

 

The point is that it's not just the little operators that do these things; it happens in many parts of the industry, including (not infrequently) even major airlines. Maintenance suffers, pilot training sometimes suffers, weights and balance are pushed, performance gets pushed, records for rest and duty and flight time are adjusted, and even pilots do it by falsifying their logbooks to add flight time.

 

The FAA tends to be fairly aggressive about going after regulatory violators, and regularly imposes fines against operators that go into the hundreds of thousands of dollars (and more). Enforcement action against pilot and mechanic certificates is common. Unfortunately, for operators to push pilots on their duty times, on their operations, is also common.

 

I've been told over the years to fly on days off, to fly over gross, and even told "I don't care if you return; I need to show that you left, for dispatch reliability." I've seen aircraft due a 100 hour or annual, pushed into a hangar, and emerged an hour later with the paperwork signed off.

 

Each pilot has a secret weapon that should be guarded and used whenever necessary, and that's the ability and willingness to say "no." Never take a job that you're not wiling to walk away from, if necessary. You can find another job, you can make another flight, but you can't do that if you're dead, or if your pilot certificate is taken away.

 

Carson was far from an isolated case of company impropriety.

 

Bear in mind that the high jury award in the crash was just that; a jury award, and the law suit went after the deepest pockets, which belonged to GE, not to Carson. The intent wasn't to vindicate the victim, or see justice; it was to get a monetary award, and the best chance of that was against the greatest source of money: GE. It worked. The jury's decision doesn't establish that the real source of the crash was GE; it establishes that the most money could be extracted from GE. The judge dismissed Carson from the suit after the penalty was awarded against them because the law suit was primarily directed at GE.

 

The case doesn't negate any other findings, and a jury award shouldn't ever be considered evidence of fact. Piper aircraft was bowled under by an utterly ridiculous jury award regarding a crashed Piper Cub, and anyone who knew the circumstances of the case (widely publicized) could see how idiotic it was (a pilot took off on a closed runway, blocked by a big X and a van, flying from the wrong seat, towing a glider, with camera equipment in the pilot seat, and ultimately crashed into the van, killing himself. His estate sued Piper for failing to put shoulder harnesses in the airplane...which weren't required at the time of manufacture. The estate won, and ultimately it drove Piper into the ground). Jury awards prove little, or nothing.

 

Carson falsified and deceived, and even after the crash went out of their way to falsify and deceive; hence, the criminal charges and prison sentences. Those sentences will never bring back the dead.

Edited June 17, 2015 by avbug

[Spike]

The ultimate tragedy is; the people who make these f’d-up decisions are rarely the ones who are killed. I’ve seen this time-and-time again. That is, managers gambling with human lives……

[avbug]

We had some engine out procedures at Baghram that involved a standard level-off to clean up the aircraft. Baghram has some big hills around it. Most of us planned to continue the climb with the engine failure to at least 15,000 or higher before looking to clean up, especially with turns required; better to have a lower turn radius. Some of us had done the calculations, and the engine-out procedures we were given would have run the aircraft into a mountain.

 

I sat on the ramp one day with a senior check airman, and I asked his view on the matter. He was very much a company man. I pointed out that following the procedure with an engine-out would put the airplane into a mountain. It was a night departure, and I told him I planned to clean up at 18,000 once I was clear and pointed toward Pakistan. He agreed.

 

He thought for a moment, then said "No, no. Just follow procedure."

 

I pointed out that the procedures we had been supplied were flawed, and that they weren't workable (or survivable). He nodded thoughtfully.

 

"You're right." He said. "But follow procedure."

 

Procedure also directed us to fly in lit up like a christmas tree. Some of us thought better of that and blacked out for night operations. We were a big enough target as it was.

 

I will always adhere to a company or agency procedure or policy, so long as it's safe. It's got to be legal and safe, or the trip shouldn't go. When down to a fine wire, if you've already gone, choose safe. Legal means you have a leg to stand on for your own defense. Safe means you get to live. Legal and safe means you get to live to defend yourself. The wisest choice, even if it's done from the unemployment line.

[Flying Pig]

What was carsons motivation to falsify their WB? Are they paid based on how much weight they can carry?

[Jaybee]

If I remember correctly in order to meet the minimum qualifications of the government contract

[Wally]

We had some engine out procedures at Baghram that involved a standard level-off to clean up the aircraft. Baghram has some big hills around it. Most of us planned to continue the climb with the engine failure to at least 15,000 or higher before looking to clean up, especially with turns required; better to have a lower turn radius. Some of us had done the calculations, and the engine-out procedures we were given would have run the aircraft into a mountain.

 

I sat on the ramp one day with a senior check airman, and I asked his view on the matter. He was very much a company man. I pointed out that following the procedure with an engine-out would put the airplane into a mountain. It was a night departure, and I told him I planned to clean up at 18,000 once I was clear and pointed toward Pakistan. He agreed.

 

He thought for a moment, then said "No, no. Just follow procedure."

 

I pointed out that the procedures we had been supplied were flawed, and that they weren't workable (or survivable). He nodded thoughtfully.

 

"You're right." He said. "But follow procedure."

 

Procedure also directed us to fly in lit up like a christmas tree. Some of us thought better of that and blacked out for night operations. We were a big enough target as it was.

 

I will always adhere to a company or agency procedure or policy, so long as it's safe. It's got to be legal and safe, or the trip shouldn't go. When down to a fine wire, if you've already gone, choose safe. Legal means you have a leg to stand on for your own defense. Safe means you get to live. Legal and safe means you get to live to defend yourself. The wisest choice, even if it's done from the unemployment line.

 

Survival is the first priority and responsibility of the PIC. The regulations recognize this in acknowledging that you may have to deviate from the FARs to deal with an emergency. Your priorities are appropriate but so was the senior check airman's response, whose remit is to teach and check company policies. That said, any professional should have acknowledged and critiqued any scenario that might require going outside policy and regs when anticipated, even if it's outside the parameters considered in the rules. Flying into a mountainside because you rigidly followed a checklist is a failing grade...

 

This conviction and the underlying events highlight the importance of thorough knowledge and integrity throughout our industry- engineers, pilots, maintenance, records, the whole ball of wax, contribute to being able to plan and use the whole aircraft's maximum capability- and no more- safely.

 

Is it factual that Mr Metheny was employed in the industry after conviction?

[avbug]

What was carsons motivation to falsify their WB? Are they paid based on how much weight they can carry?

 

Carson wanted to meet the contract requirements, which include payload capability and performance, as established in the initial notice on which Carson bid. If the aircraft were too heavy or performance limited, they may have been ineligible to bid a contract, or in danger of losing the contract. There's also always an underlying desire to perform; contracts are awarded for single years, with subsequent years that may be continued assuming that the season evaluations support carrying the contract. If a company routinely underperforms or can't do the job, their performance evaluations will be low and they'll have a hard time securing work, such as additional contracts or contract extensions.

 

After the fact, Carson attempted to falsify data because the USFS/OAS/AMD demanded re-weighing of the fleet. Carson executives knew that their data was falsified, and attempted to get their personnel to falsify the new tests, to make the weights closer to the fake pre-crash data. Carson got caught, and personnel refused to falsify the tests.

[nightsta1ker]

It's all fun and games until someone gets hurt...

Edited July 7, 2015 by nightsta1ker